Good Thing, To o,4 and other paradigm-shifting books, and who re cently left law teaching for a position in university administration,5 has written one last volume giving his colleagues in the profession he left behind something to think about. In his previous work, Fish, who taught English and law at Duke University, addressed central legal is sues such as meaning, communication, and textual interpretation, challenging such received wisdoms as that every text has a single, de terminate meaning, or that a regime of free speech is the best guaran tor of truth and democratic government.
This Review begins by smnmarizing The Trouble with Principle, paying particular attention· to passages that· show' Fish at his anti foundationalist best -sections on hate speech (pp. 75-150), affirma tive action (pp. 4, 20-21, 26-33, 310), academic freedom (pp. 34-45), and religion (pp. 153-284). Because Fish's prose is elegant but his ar gument demanding, I offer a metaphor,designed to help readers un derstand Fish's insight.6 I then show that the defect Fish highlights is part of a larger disconnection that afflicts legal discourse, looming up not only when we discuss affirmative action, hate speech, and other controversial public-law issues, but also when we try to fit ordinary private-law rules into a coherent system.7 In short, Fish exposes only part of a more general self-delusion running throughout our system of legal thought. In a concluding section, I recommend a pragmatic, anti normative approach, similar to Fish's, but applied more broadly, to guard against thuggery operating under the guise of principle. Such an approach, tied closely to our deeply held moral convictions, I argue, can help us remember to support what we need to support, resist what we need to resist, and avoid losing our way, like a proprioceptively handicapped patient,8 in the "body of law."
I. CATCHING A BIG ONE: FISH ON PRINCIPLE
Consider the controversy that broke out when civil rights activists demanded that South Carolina stop flying the Confederate flag over its statehouse on the ground that it insults African Americans by gra tuitously recalling the evil regime of slavery.9 For their part, a number of South Carolina citizens retorted that the flag has nothing to do with slavery or white supremacy, but merely symbolizes regional pride and tradition.10 They marshaled, in other words, the very same principles -respect for history and the feelings of a social group -that blacks and their supporters invoked to retire the flag.
Or, consider the controversy that broke out on January 17, 2000, General Robert E. Lee's birthday, when an unknown person set fire to a banner of the Confederate general in Richmond, Virginia.11 The Sons of Confederate Veterans immediately demanded that the police 6. See infra Parts II-III. (Vol. 99:1370 treat the torching as a hate crime.12 As with the first example, forces on either side of the controversy cited the same principle -anti bigotry -in support of their position.
Over the course of sixteen short but tightly woven chapters, Stanley Fish documents how paying attention ·to the way language works in controversies like these enables us to avoid ensnarement in traps of our own -or our adversaries' -making. He shows how ar guments from principle almost always conceal, in fact presuppose, politics and self-interest. He explains how we can avoid having princi ples we hold up on one occasion turned against us on another.
Consider a widely held principle of ethics: that one should keep one's word. In an early passage, Fish mentions an episode from the classic western movie The Wild Bunch, which features an outlaw gang led by two grizzled veterans, played by William Holden and Ernest Borgnine (pp. 1-2). At one point in the movie, the two characters are sitting around discussing a one-time comrade-in-arms who has gone straight and now rides at the head of a band of railroad enforcement officers bent on bringing his former friends to justice. The Borgnine character muses that he cannot believe their old friend changed sides and wonders why he does not return to the gang, where the stakes are higher and the life more exciting. The Holden character reminds Borgnine that the turncoat undoubtedly gave his word to the railroad. So what? Borgnine replies. It's not giving your word that is important -it is whom you give your word to (pp. [1] [2] .
The exchange makes plain that Fish sides with the "contextualizer" -the Borgnine character. Principles rarely guide us in the abstract; only in their use. Always stated at such a high level of generality that a speaker can use them to arrive at whatever conclusion he wants, their very point, according to Fish, is to make discourse appear inevitable and high-minded, when it is the social and political commitments of the speaker that allow them to gain any purchase (e.g., pp. 3, 8-10, 44-45, 115-17, 142-46). And, if we had the courage of our convictions, we would do away with the overlay of appeals to principle that litter so much of legal and social discourse and amount to little more than noise.13 12. Id. As everyone knows, civil rights groups have been urging enactment of hate-crime statutes that criminalize burning crosses and other acts that send messages of hate to minor ity communities.
13. Pp. 142-43, 146 (urging that we make decisions "nakedly" -without dressing them up in abstractions). To be sure, in other places Fish argues that we are quite unlikely to go this far, and so ends up recommending that we argue principles for all they are worth. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. Fish's suggestion is typical of anti-foundationalists generally, who maintain that foundations, like theories and principles, give us nothing that we did not have already, and that we can reason, understand, communicate, and have knowledge perfectly well without them. See 2-3 ). Abstractions like fa irness, reasonableness, and mutual respect only gain content by proceeding "from the vantage point of some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is or should be" (pp. 2-3). When someone begins an argument by in voking a principle of some sort, we only learn where he is going a little later, when we find out what he means by fa irness or equality or due process. "[T)hat someone is invoking neutral principles will give you no clue as to where he is likely to come out until he actually arrives there and reveals his substantive positions" (p .. 8).
One cannot avoid, then, getting substantive and engaging in frankly partisan, ends-based reasoning. Moral commitments are all we really know; principles only help "partisan agents to attach an honor ific vocabulary to their agendas" (p. 7). Throughout history, some of the worst cruelty has been carried out in the name of principleeugenics,15 Manifest Destiny,16 converting souls to Catholicism.17 One sometimes cannot avoid resorting to principle in making one's point.18 But one should do so for consciously acknowledged rhetorical reasons -to advance one's cause, to provide a judge an excuse for ruling in one's fa vor -while fully aware that one's opponent will be trying to do the same thing.
By the same token, one should be wary of the many ways argu ments from principle can serve ignoble ends. For example, Fish notes that for conservatives, "the basic move is to tum historically saturated situations into [ones] detached from any specific historical circum stance and then conclude that a proposed policy either follows from this carefully emptied context or is barred by it."19 Thus, when 19. P. 4; see also p. 43 (arguing that the ACLU style of thinking is often parroted by in dividuals with definite goals -not free speech "but sales of pornography, maintenance of lily-white construction crews, the disadvantaging of minority religions, and so on").
(Vol. 99:1370 Justice Brown in Plessy v. Ferguson approved a railroad's "separate but equal" law that consigned blacks to certain designated cars, on the disingenuous ground that it treated black and white passengers "the same," he detached a rule or act from its historical meaning -indeed, from any meaning at all.20 Any principle, Fish writes, even that of non discrimination, arises in response to historical circumstances. In 1954, society came to believe that discrimination is wrong;21 before that, it did not. The principle, then, has no inherent meaning; that comes only from the substantive issues with which it has been associated.
Left of center on most (not all) issues, Fish makes many of his points in the first part, entitled "Politics All the Way Down," at the expense of conservatives. For example, he points out that writers of this persuasion are prone to decry current "circumstances," com plaining that the country has gone to the dogs, liberals are running the campuses, barbarians are at the gates, and they -the right -are the brave defenders of value in a wilderness increasingly devoid of it (pp. 20-21). But at the same time, they insist that Hispanics and blacks should rise above "circumstances," unaided by affirmative action or special measures aimed at redressing past disadvantage.22 The same crowd at one time draws attention to circumstances, and at another dismisses their relevance.
Neutral principles not only provide feeble guidance, they disable us from seeing differences that matter, such as those between pornog raphy and Michelangelo, between oppression and the relief of it, be tween advocacy of racial reform and Nazis marching in Skokie.23 ("Nazism is an idea, after all, is it not?"). After Brown v. Board of Education24 was decided, Herbert Wechsler wondered whether the case was principled, since it seemed arbitrarily to trade the right of blacks to associate. with whites for the right of whites not to associate with blacks (p. 26). But equations like that one, Fish writes, empty de sires of any historical content and equalize them when they are fa r from morally equivalent (pp. 26-27). For example, a legal test that asks whether a measure displays race-consciousness and, if so, mechani cally strikes it down, "displaces history and morality."25 One that helps 20. P. 4; see also pp. 5-15 (questioning whether any policy can treat fairly and equally groups with radically different histories and current situations). [l] iberal neutrality does political work so well because it has assumed the mantle of being above politic[s]" (p. 44), so that "if you don't like the political work it is doing, you must labor to take the mantle away, strip off the veneer of principle so that policies that wear the mask of principle will be forced to identify themselves for what they are and what they are not" (p. 44). Affirmative action, for example, is good or bad, not because it violates or legitimates some principle. Reasonable arguments may be made about it -Does it work? Does it stigmatize its intended beneficiaries? -but these are the right ones to ask. " [T] he debate is always between competing structures of exclusion" (p. 44). Principles and abstractions have no independent moral force "except as the rhetorical accompaniments of practices in search of good public relations" (p. 45). Fish cautions his readers to beware of moments when one's opponents "have a public relations machine so good that it's killing you, for then you're going to have to stop and try to take it apart" (p. 45).
But Fish is not only hard on conservatives. In the middle sections of his book, he examines some items of faith dear to the left, including multiculturalism, whose advocates, according to Fish, are rarely pre pared to follow it to its logical conclusion. They quickly pull back when one of the cultures they have been defending engages in some thing they consider barbaric (such as female genital surgery or fa twahs sitions that they have previously been connected with -we become bogged down, tricked into inaction and complacency. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
26. Pp. 26-28, [79] [80] [81] [82] 287 . By allowing ourselves to be led off into a search for something other than our substantive convictions, by claiming to rely on a higher force, we suffer a "forced inability to make distinctions that would be perfectly clear to any well-informed teenager." P. 43 (going on to cite as an example the difference between a lynching and a mi nority set-aside).
27. Pp. 3, 4-7, 9, 12-14, 146, 242, 287, 293. When an argument is framed in a way that "labels itself a higher morality [it ends up being] so high that, from its lofty perspective, we are unable to see either the forest or the trees." P. 29; se e also p. 14 (equating morality with taking a stand).
[Vol. 99:1370 aimed at writers who challenge religious orthodoxy) or begin denying the legitimacy of other cultures or religions.28
Chapter Five, entitled "The Rhetoric of Regret,"29 skewers a sec ond liberal platitude, free speech, which Fish considers yet another perverse manifestation of proceduralism. The American Civil Liber ties Union, for example, imagines itself bravely standing up for Nazis and other unpopular speakers, and rising above mere preference (pp. [78] [79] . Society is supposed to be even-handed as among speakers, pre ferring none and disadvantaging none, not even ones voicing ideas we justly despise (pp. 76-79). But as later chapters point out, every speech act discriminates against ones left unsaid; every utterance aims at kill ing another, countervailing one. That is what speech does; its very conditions entail selection among points of view (pp. 93-94, 98, 122-24 ) . The idea of a perfectly f r ee marketplace of ideas in which un committed observers dispassionately sample and choose ideas, some what in the manner of a diner selecting from a restaurant menu, is conceptual nonsense.
The notion of pre-normative tolerance is not only impossible, the argument that it is the cornerstone of Western democracy is demon strably fa lse. The United States fought World War II not because Nazis were intolerant of free speech, but of Jews (pp. 83-85). If any thing, "[I]t is the habit of framing everything in terms of principle that makes people confused about what they really want and renders them vulnerable to certain argumentative ploys" (pp. 88, 20-21). Speech is always coercive. "You go to the trouble of asserting X because some other persons have been asserting Y" (p. 93). One speaks not to en courage others to speak but to change something in the world, to bind others to one's point of view (p. 93). All speech is action; all free speech defenders (even self-professed absolutists) admit exceptions corresponding to that which they politically detest (p. 94).
The way to resolve most speech controversies is to consider one's substantive commitments and apply ordinary common sense. For ex-28. Pp. 56-59. This superficial, or "boutique," multiculturalism illustrates the shallow ness of reducing everything to an abstract notion of individual rights. A boutique multicul turalist respects another culture and takes an interest in it until he or she gets to the core or substance of it. The multiculturalist does not embrace the substance of the religion, the part those who follow it feel most strongly about, particularly if the religion denies the legitimacy of other religions. This is so because the multiculturalist is caught up, not in human rights, but in the capacity to exercise those rights. Fish further explores this problem in his discus sion of academic freedom: "What you are is your capacity for speech, belief, and choice and not what is believed and spoken and chosen, then you are obligated, as a mark of self respect -since you define yourself by general capacities that belong equally to everyone -to re spect the beliefs, utterances, and choices of others." This focus on capacity rather than sub stance renders one, "morally thin." P. 41. In the end, multiculturalism turns out to be "an incoherent concept that cannot be meaningfully affirmed or rejected." P. 66.
29. P. 75. The term comes from the ACLU's frequent soulful professions that it detests Nazis, pornographers, and utterers of hate speech, but must defend them anyway, for the sake of principle. Pp. 78-79. ample, what is the difference between having Marxists or bigots speak on campus? Easy -Marxists are educationally useful, bigots are not (p. 89). What is the difference between a law prohibiting demonstra tors from harassing women seeking abortion counseling and a hunter's rights bill that penalizes animal rights activists who approach hunters with picket signs? Also easy -history discloses no great need to pro tect hunters, but more than one thousand acts of violence at abortion clinics made a protective bill for women going there necessary (p. 89). What is the difference between early civil rights bills and recent race conscious efforts to ease college admissions for blacks and Hispanics? Nothing -the early bills were aimed not at producing a colorblind society but at improving conditions for blacks, just as the current measures are.30
Who is to decide speech controversies -judges, college presi dents? Where does one draw the line? Sometimes the consequences of not drawing the line are intolerable (pp. 91-92). As an example of a case where the judiciary backed away from an opportunity to draw a clear normative line, Fish gives the case of Skokie. Other examples might be hate speech, pornography, and violent TV programming aimed at young children. "[R]egulation [which draws lines] is a consti tutive feature of social life, not a deformation of it" (p. 127). Speech and censorship are inseparable. In the final pages of Part II, Fish turns to the work of First Amendment theorists such as Robert Post, Richard Abel, and Judith Butler, all of whom criticize the legal system for invoking medieval formulas and would-be universalisms, but end up either not going far enough or shrinking from their own conclu sions and embracing some new universalism (pp. 126-42). Fish con cludes by urging that we make decisions "nakedly" -by resort to substantive visions of what is good and desirable, not from theory purporting to have erased substance.31 If one's substantive convictions already tell one what to do, why invoke an abstraction? Doing so just invites the other side to invoke a countervailing one, so that the rest of the conversation is framed in terms of bloodless entities, when the situation (in the words of the title of one of Fish's chapters) is "fraught with death."32 30. P. 89. By the law's logic, however, all these groups -Marxists and bigots, hunters and abortion providers -stand on the same footing, smashed together by an overarching principle, with the result that "in our own history, procedural justice has been contaminated by the very value judgments it supposedly brackets." P. 75.
31. Pp. 67-71, 142-46, 149 (pointing out that many liberals see hate speech as a problem of disrespectful communication, when it is in fact an evil to be confronted and extinguished).
32. Chapter 6 (pp. 93-114) (analyzing the Skokie case and the impossibility of free speech). This maneuver often works: "In recent years, liberals have been discombobulated when a practice they abhor is defended by invoking the same principle they had themselves invoked in order to argue for a position they favor." P. 88.
[Vol. 99:1370 In Part III ("Reasons for the Devout"), Fish, somewhat surpris ingly, takes up the cause of religion. Liberal reasoning always fa ils to come to terms with that institution, in part because the devout be liever places his values over "fairness,'' "dialog,'' and "tolerance of other points of view," principles the liberal relies on to keep every thing more or less in line (p. 208-09). For example, liberals would like to rein in religiously motivated abortion protesters who hound women at clinics (pp. 89, 297). But their arguments fall on deaf ears because the protesters consider that they are protecting human life, the highest principle of all (pp. 187, 209). Any principle the liberal holds up, such as "dialog," or "consideration of other people's point of view," will make little impression on the ardent believer, for that is the nature of religious belief -to be intolerant of other systems (p. 297). Religion is not like a graduate seminar, where every point of view is considered on its own merits.33 " [T] here are no reasons you can give to the de vout, not because they are the kind of people who don't listen to rea son but because the reasons you might give can never be reasons for them unless they convert to your faith or you ... to theirs" (p. 209).
In short, religion, like "every discourse, even one filled with words like 'fair' and 'impartial,' is an engine of exclusion and therefore a means of coercion" (p. 223). The very way we frame controversiesfor example, as viewpoint censorship (in case one is disposed to grant funding of some religious group) versus establishment of religion (if one is negatively disposed) -determines the outcome (p. 228). "Lib eralism's attempt to come to terms with illiberal energies ... cannot succeed without enacting the illiberalis m it opposes" (p. 242). Beliefs do change, Fish says, not by resort to arguments from prin ciple, but by pointing out to the adversary that the consequences of his or her belief conflict with something dear to him.36 Fish recounts the experience of a devotee of human eugenics who heard a speech by a leading white supremacist. Among other things, the speaker railed at society's unwillingness to rid itself of misfits such as children born with cleft palates (pp. 281-82). The listener, who had a child with cleft pal ate of whom he was very fond, immediately reconsidered his position -not as a result of any argument from principle, but rather upon learning that his fellow travelers espoused something he could not support because of something in his.life (pp. 282-83).
In a final section, entitled "Credo," Fish gives his readers a glim mer of what he does believe.37 The list will come as no surprise: antiracism, affirmative action, legal protection for the environment and for historically disadvantaged groups such as gays and lesbians, and toleration for radical or marginalized religions.38 In deciding how to advance one's commitments, Fish recommends the approach known as pragmatism: decide particular courses of action in light of current and historical circumstances, including the probability of success, the likelihood of backlash, and the range of options available.39 It is these midlevel, local, and historical concerns -the very ones that argu ments from principle claim to transcend -. that should guide us.40 Nothing is wrong with rhetoric and persuasion, Fish says, even in cluding arguments from principle, if one thinks these will wound one's adversary or give him pause. But in trying to decide, for ourselves, what to do, where to throw our weight, we need more compelling ma terial than that.
Thus, although Fish first suggests we abandon principle, he later offers this more pragmatic approach (pp. 8, 44-45, 126-42). In the first part of the book he suggests fairly explicitly that we jettison principle: "What's a liberal to do? My answer is simply: forget about the princi ple (and therefore stop being a liberal), which was never what you were interested in the first place, and make an argument for the policy on policy grounds, that is, on the grounds that you think it is good and right" (p. 89). But the use of principle is not only an approved, but a necessary move, so that Fish cheerfully acknowledges that his original 36. Pp. 301, 307-08; see also pp. 282-83. 40. P. 312; see also p. 63 (approving a version of Charles Taylor's "inspired adhoccery ": "What [I] mean is that the solutions to particular problems will be found by regarding each situation-of-crisis as an opportunity for improvisation and not as an occasion for the applica tion of rules and principles .... ").
[Vol. 99:1370 suggestion collapses "in the wake of formalism's fa ilure -the fa ilure of the search for neutral principles -everything remains as it was" (p. 294). Ultimately, then, Fish's solution is to embrace the rhetorical value of principle and exploit it for all its worth: "You are free to de ploy it (or not) when the occasion suggests it would be good to do so .... Since they won't commit you to acting in any particular way, you can traffic in them without worrying that some bad residue will be left on your skin" (p. 295). Fish comes full circle, yet at the end of our journey we are better off: we no longer need to feel the internal con flict that ensues from adhering to a certain principle in one situation and arguing against it in another. Because we are no longer duped by principles -understanding them for what they are and are not -"[r]hetorics in long, short, and middle versions are already there for the quarrying; and what's even better, using them in a moment of need commits you to nothing, necessarily, in the next moment. After you have gotten from one what you want, you can just put it back on the shelf" (p. 296). Fish is offering awareness of the rhetorical power of principle as a tool for effectively dealing with conservatives who use liberal principles, but "repackaged and put in the service of the very agenda [we] once fought" (p. 312). In short, pragmatism.
" Religion cannot be tolerant -that is a contradiction in terms, a little like a veggie burger. Liberalism cannot deal sensibly with affirmative action, hate speech, or academic freedom -it ends up tying itself in knots.42 Near the end of his book, Fish addresses the question many readers might be wondering about, namely, if principle offers no safeguard against tyranny and raw power, what does? Fish answers that the best weapon we have -aside from our own moral convictions and well-honed rhetoric -is a constitutional structure that includes separation of powers.43 This structure erects a barrier against official oppression, namely a system of "checks and balances" that divides government, assures slow change, and discourages spon taneous action aimed at hurting small groups or the sorts of "conflicts that tore English society apart in the seventeenth century" (p. 301). "These virtues [depriving people and state actors of opportunities for oppression] are the properties of the system, not of those who live un-41. P. 289. In law, the question is "what will go " in this case or that -which courses of action, which rulings, with be perceived as respectable and familiar ("We've seen this be fore"). Lawyers' stock-in-trade is finding and putting forward "something people like us say when issues like this come up" -in short precedent. Judging is rhetoric of a certain stylized, conventional kind. Pp. 288-89; see also Feldman, supra note 13, at 692 (observing that the public needs to believe that judges act on the basis of constitutional principles).
42. Pp. 63-66, 71, 79, 187. And, if it doesn't, its conservative enemies quickly accomplish that through a series of standard moves.
43. P. 301; see also p. 306 (reiterating role of founding documents).
der it. "44
After a brief excursion into the role of metaphor, this Review ex amines whether Fish's fa ith in constitutional structure as a safeguard against tyranny is warranted.
II. A METAPHOR FOR STANLEY FISH: THE BODY OF LAW AS PROPRIOCEPTIVEL Y DERANGED
Fish's prose style is clean and lucid. But his argument is so intri cate, demanding, and, at times, counterintuitive that many readers may fa il to grasp its full sweep.45 As an aid to the lost (or time pressured) reader, consider the metaphor of the legal system as a pro prioceptively damaged human body.
In recent years, legal commentators have called attention to the way certain features of legal reasoning resemble patients who suffer a type of neurological impairment, namely damage to the body's pro prioceptive centers.46 For the reader unfamiliar with it, proprioception is the name for the human fa culty -a sort of sixth sense -that in forms us about our bodily position and location of our limbs in rela tion to each other.47 It tells us whether we are standing straight or leaning forward, without having to look. Patients who lose this sense, through injury or illness, feel disembodied.48 Unable to locate their 44. P. 306. Fish appears to recognize that deconstruction of principle, even if it makes liberals feel better about adhering to one principle for one agenda and abandoning it the next, does little for the disenfranchised suffering from, e.g., affirmative action's demise or the law's toleration of hate speech. Merely showing that the sources of one's misery lies in conservatives' better use of rhetoric is little solace. Thus, Fish recognizes that other safe guards are needed and that they may be found, perhaps, in the structure of the Constitution. Proprioception is used to provide our internal body image -that is, the way (in addition to visual stimuli) in which our brain receives information about the position of our body. Pro prioceptors are sense organs buried deep in the tissues of muscles, tendons, and joints that give rise to the sensations of weight, positions of the body, and the amount of bending in various joints. When this system sustains an injury, one literally loses touch with one's body. [Vol. 99:1370 bodies in relation to themselves and to objects in the external world, they describe themselves as bodiless or "pithed."49
In a chapter of his book, The Man Who Mistook His Wife fo r a Hat,50 neurosurgeon Oliver Sacks describes a patient named Christina, the "disembodied lady."51 Christina, who until that time had been a robust, self-assured young woman who worked as a computer pro grammer and liked hockey and riding, was admitted to the hospital for a gallstone operation,52 On the day of the operation, perhaps as a reac tion to routine antibiotic treatment, Christina had a disturbing dream, in which she swayed wildly, could not feel the ground underneath her self, and kept dropping things because she could hardly feel anything in her hands.53 A psychiatrist diagnosed her as suffering from pre operative anxiety ("we see it all the time"),54 but later that day Christina's dream came true. She found herself unsteady on her feet, in danger of toppling over, and could hold nothing in her hands, which "wandered" unless she kept an eye on them.55 On testing, her parietal lobes turned out to be working, but "had nothing to work with."56 She had lost all proprioception and had no muscle, tendon, or neuroskele tal sense whatever. Her position sense was entirely gone, never to re turn.57
Christina is condemned to live in an indescribable, unimaginable realm -though 'non-realm', and 'nothingness', might be ... better words for it. At times she breaks down -not in public, but with me: 'If only I could feel!' she cries. 'But I've forgotten what it's like ... I was normal, wasn't I? I did move like everyone else?'58 Sacks took to showing Christina home movies of herself with her chil dren, taken just before the onset of her condition, before she became "pithed," "disembodied," "a sort of wraith."59
The plight of the proprioceptively impaired individual is similar to the predicament Fish diagnoses in the person who approaches real world problems by first asking what principle commands and ends up 49. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59. In some respects, his fa te is even worse than that of Christina, who only needed to open her eyes to see where her hands were.60 One who puts his fa ith in principle sees an infinitude of hands, with little way of telling which are his own. Like a pithed patient, he is doomed to in habit a body of law filled with myriad, often contradictory, principles, each with a seemingly equal claim to his allegiance and pointing in dif ferent directions.61
OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT, AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES (1985
When Fish writes that substantive commitments are more impor tant than neutral principles, when social scientists point out that high scores on the Graduate Record Exam are negatively correlated with social empathy,62 and when a recent book documents that higher levels of education were inversely related rescue behavior toward Jews dur ing the Holocaust,63 he is highlighting different aspects of the same 60. See id. at 46-49.
61. See supra notes 30, 32, 34 and accompanying text. Like the patient whose proprio ception is compromised, legal thinkers can go through their professional lives slightly (or in some cases, greatly) "out of touch," but unable to quite put their fingers on why. Like the patient, their sense of self is skewed, their positional senses dictated by principles that, rather than being full of meaning and, therefore, providing some semblance of guidance, are liter ally empty -waiting to be spewed to fit any agenda, waiting to be filled in the blank to jus tify whichever outcome is sought. The contradictory results that Fish cites -restrictions on affirmative action, protecting speech that ends up suppressing other voices, the hypocrisy of academic freedom, our schizophrenic view of religion -are each a result of this artificial guidance system. See Jack M. Balkin, The Court Defers to a Racist Era, N. Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000 , at A23 (noting that the Supreme Court and Congress view much of civil rights legisla tion as based on the Interstate Commerce Clause, when a more natural home would be the Fourteenth Amendment). Just as Sacks's Christina "consciously or automatically adopted and sustained a sort of forced or wilful or histrionic posture to make up for the continuing lack of any genuine, natural posture," SACKS, supra note 50, at 48, by relying on a flawed guidance system, the legal actor backs into awkward, inauthentic results.
Who, then, will be the neurologist for our society? We will have to dismantle our rheto ric, suggests Fish, and realize that to hide behind principle is like kicking someone under neath a glass table -you are fooling no one. When we step away from the constraints of principle, we will walk straight again. For example, when we step back from the notion of a colorblind Constitution we will recognize that it does make a difference if the active party is the KKK or the NAACP. Similarly, when we are free from the clutches of a lofty but empty notion of individual rights we will see that a Shakespearean sonnet and hard-core pornogra phy are distinct. By recognizing that one cannot have a procedural mechanism that is not hostage to judgments of substance, one will no longer be forced to defend speech acts one despises, or brush one's values aside for the sake of procedural purity. Pp. Fish is right about the unreliability of principle and also about what we should depend on in our personal lives, instead. But what of his suggestion that, with law and politics, we look not to principle, but to the structure of our Constitution, including separation of powers, for guidance? Unfortunately, that feature turns out to offer no more protection than does our current fa scination with principle.
III. D ISCONNECT-How O UR SYSTEM OF P UBLIC AND P RIVATE LAW O PERATES AT C ROSS-P URPOSES
According to Fish, we should abjure principle as a guide to per sonal action and look instead to two other sources -our own moral commitments, in the personal realm, 66 and the principle of separation of powers, which assures that governmental authority is weakened and subject to constant checks and balances, including popular will, in the political one. 6 7 Nothing is wrong with relying on one's own substantive moral commitments. But with his second prescription, Fish fa lls into the same proceduralist trap he warns against elsewhere. Government has even fewer scruples than individual actors do; indeed, the hope that it will restrain itself for reasons of morality is probably the most classic category mistake of all. 6 8 Even more than individual actors, governments have readily accessible a panoply of principles -sover eignty, national interest, free trade, manifest destiny, even human rights -to rationalize what they really want to do. 6 9 Fish believes that, even if government is inclined to act badly, our constitutional principles of limited government, separation of powers, and checks and balances, will guard against overreaching (p. 301). But consider how readily government can find ways around these limiting principles. Congress is supposed to be the only branch of government able to declare war.70 Yet, the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.71 Since he is able to deploy troops practically at will, it is easy for the president to circumvent Congress's authority; indeed, most recent wars have been undeclared. 72 Or, consider the Plenary Power doctrine, under which the judiciary declines to review matters having to do with immigration, even ones presenting clear-cut equal protection issues,73 or the myriad of related doctrines, including abstention,74 mootness,75 and political questions76 that enable judges to avoid deciding issues. that might require politi cally sensitive interference with another branch of government. 7 7
Well-funded interest groups and corporations are able to ensure that all three branches of government fa vor policies they want ad vanced,78 rendering chimerical the hope that any one of them will act as a real check against another in an area vitally affecting the interests of corporate power or the military. When powerful interest groups need immediate action, they increasingly short-circuit the political process by financing referenda and initiative campaigns that mobilize the public on behalf of tax-cutting, nativist, or antiminority measures. 79 Finally, the very structure of our system of public and private law suffers from such a major disjunction, traceable to our founding documents, that adroit invocation of a high-sounding principle will generally allow one to reach any desired result. This is worth explain ing in some detail.
The large ideas underlying American public law -administrative regularity, the equality of all moral agents, one-man one vote, due process/dignity of treatment, dialog/free speech -have always stood in tension with those that govern private law -free accumulation of [Vol. 99:1370 wealth, liberty of contract, employment at will, stability of expecta tions, protection of private property, and the right to leave it all to your children, even if they are no good.80 This hybrid, which promises radical democracy in our public sphere, and individualistic free market capitalism in the private one, today, even more than formerly, is on a collision course with itself. Until recently, the public side has always managed to counter some of the excesses of aggressive capitalism by assuring that at least a few members of the working class would rise and assume places in government, academia, and the professions. 81 But now, globalism and the advent of an economy based on com puters and information are concentrating capital so rapidly in the hands of a small elite that the uneasy truce that allowed the two headed system to work is beginning to break down.82 Already the most economically stratified society in the industrialized world, the United States is increasingly taking on the appearance and structure of an oli garchy.83 Moreover, the high costs of political campaigns and TV ads guarantee government by the wealthy into the foreseeable future. 84 Formerly, public education served as an avenue of upward mobil ity, enabling an occasional poor but bright child to rise. Functioning as a conduit between the private sector � the realm of self-interestand the public spheres of government, higher education, and the me dia, free schooling closed some of the gap between the private and the public, enabling a few from the lower economic strata, or their chil dren, to move up.85 It allowed us to believe that democracy and capi talism were compatible. But now that avenue is narrowing as conser vatives realize that today's economy does not need large numbers of unskilled or semiskilled workers.86 What manufacturing that is neces sary is done more cheaply by moving fa ctories to the Third World, where the cost of labor is lower,87 while public education can be con ducted more cheaply by emphasizing tests,88 attacking teachers' un ions,89 and offering the illusion of choice through charter schools and vouchers.90
At the same time, Congress has been slow to reform elections, ei ther by financing campaigns so that poor but talented candidates have a chance of winning,91 or by adopting redistricting or voting changes aimed at improving the chances of minority and blue-collar candi dates.92 This inattention to school funding and election reform places enough barriers in the way of the poor that the chances of an inner city child growing up to be president of the United States seem virtu ally nil.
Our public and private systems of law do contain devices to control distortions of various types -but generally only within each system. Our public law contains strict scrutiny, in which courts examine skep tically any restraint on the exercise of a basic (usually political) right, such as speech or association93 or the rights of minority groups.94 It also prohibits gross political misbehavior such as the bribery of a pub lic official,95 while our private law contains other guarantees against [Vol. 99:1370 distortion in such rules as antitrust,96 corporate governance law,97 and bankruptcy. 98 Yet no comparable feature protects social mobility, the ability of private citizens to gain an education or launch a political campaign. Case law deems education not a fundamental right,99 poverty not a suspect class;100 moreover, our society has rebelled, until now, at funding independent candidates for political office.101 Our system, in short, proceeds like a hydra-headed creature, with one head consisting of a highly idealized system of public law; another, a less idealized pri vate law governing the way we make profits and earn livings, but little to mediate between the two.102 Like the patient Christina, our pri vate/public law structure is as disconnected and stumbling as any of Oliver Sacks's patients. 103 Fish's solution -that we look to our legal system's broad structure for guarantees against oppression -leads to the very blind alley he describes over the course of 368 pages on the defects of mainstream legal reasoning.
It turns out, then, that our predicament is even deeper than Fish paints. We cannot rely on separation of powers nor on popular will to guard against domination by our own government or by well-financed elites. Furthermore, principle will rarely stop a determined adversary. We are left, then, with little more than the resources we bring to any encounter, primarily our own intuitions, growing out of our life expe riences with justice and injustice, and what political alliances we may make with like-minded individuals in support of common ends. For Fish, as for this writer, to believe that we have more is a dangerous il lusion, one that threatens to disconnect us, in an almost neurological sense, from the sources of action and belief that really matter.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Fish simply wants to reveal what principles are notnot so much to get us to abandon them as to alleviate some of the in ternal anxiety that espousing them creates. If we follow his lead, we will no longer have to feel "pithed," or disoriented, because of serious flaws in our internal compass. We can use rhetoric to our heart's con tent and not feel guilty or hypocritical -because there is no other way. 104 Yet, a deeper look at the structure of our legal system reveals that our quandary is more profound than Fish exposes. A fundamental contradiction in our system, which throws our public and private law at odds with each other, prevents Fish's solution -to simply exploit rhetoric (while keeping aware of its traps) and relying on our constitu tional structure to safeguard us -from working.
In The Trouble with Principle, Stanley Fish reveals only the first stages of an illness endemic in our legal system. Because he fa ils to recognize how deep the predicament runs, he offers up a solution that cannot be used by a society increasingly mired in self-contradiction.
Not until we open up avenues for upward mobility or reconcile the contradiction between public and private law will we be able to orient ourselves in any satisfactory way, or develop defenses against the types of deep, structural inequalities that are developing at such a frightening pace.
